

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF TRUTH

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Before delving into anything about Ludwig Wittgenstein, it's important to have a firm grasp of both his early and later philosophical beliefs. Because he had studied science and had even begun an Aeronautical-Engineering degree, Wittgenstein had a strong attachment to the world of things. Another philosophical movement that had an impact on Wittgenstein was the "Vienna-Circle" movement, which aimed to eliminate the term "meta-physical" from philosophical discourse. Philosophical debates began using language rather than physical things as the medium for Wittgenstein's early attempts to establish philosophy on an established moral basis as a consequence of his time as an undergraduate at the University of Vienna's "Vienna-Circle" activists. This means that Wittgenstein's philosophy was always grounded in linguistics; nonetheless, his viewpoint on philosophy was fundamentally altered as a result of his linguistic method. He studied under Gotlob Frege, known as the "Father of Modern Analytic Philosophy," and Bertrand Russell, a world-renowned philosopher known for his versatility. A work by Wittgenstein, titled 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus,' was written in order to provide philosophical conclusions with a level of certainty and uniqueness that could only be achieved via the use of logic. To put it another way, a philosophical thesis must be either true or false; no statement may have both the true and false or none of these qualities at the same time.' Wittgenstein used an object-oriented linguistic style he named "Early-Wittgenstein" in his philosophical debates. Wittgenstein claimed that he had solved all of the philosophical mysteries after authoring the book 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus.' It wasn't until four or five years later that Wittgenstein realised that metaphysical terms were the proper subject matter for philosophical discussions, and thus, instead of writing his "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus," the philosopher wrote "Philosophical Investigations," which used everyday language. So, Wittgenstein concludes that there is no requirement for logical language (TLP), and that ordinary language may be used in a similar fashion to mathematical calculus to explain philosophical issues. 'Later-Wittgenstein' refers to Wittgenstein's use of everyday language in philosophical discussions.

Before composing the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Wittgenstein had no doubts as to its veracity. Furthermore, he was aware that all of the important philosophical questions had been answered. After the First World War, Wittgenstein did indeed forsake philosophy, but as he progressively lost faith in the Tractatus's inaccessibility, he returned to philosophy to be considered earlier in part.

Despite Wittgenstein's faith in the reality of Tractatus when he returned to Cambridge in 1929, it is not true that he was persuaded of the falsehood of the Tractatus thesis at the time. The Tractatus would not be included in his Ph.D. thesis if he hadn't done so. In this section, I'll explain why Wittgenstein was so enthusiastic about Tractatus (Wittgenstein's early conception of philosophy) and how he incorporated it into his Philosophical Investigations (Later view of Wittgenstein toward philosophy). There's no such thing as "things" in the universe, but rather "facts," according to his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. This, however, is erroneous. There are three ways to describe the world: "An account of the world in terms of facts, an account of the world in terms of things, and an explanation of the facts in relation to events are merely an account of the world in three languages. Then, as Early-Wittgenstein said, a statement isn't a proposition at all unless it has a specific meaning. (b) The fundamental error of this view is not so much in requiring in absolute determining sense, but rather in thinking that the very idea of such a sense is even understandable consider the following analogy. A proposition must have no room for ambiguity; there must be no scope for any possible doubt or uncertainty. One should not fall into the trap of saying that even the greatest wristwatch in the world does not maintain perfectly perfect time, but is still good enough for most practical reasons. Claims that time can be defined in such a manner as to be accurate are problematic since the definition of time changes greatly depending on the context in which it is used. How can a shopkeeper be charged of dishonesty if he says that the business will be closed for precisely one month and then only closes it for a week, rather than a week or even a month? Achieve your end aim at this stage. For the most part, if my watch is accurate enough to keep me on time for things like appointments, trains, and so on, then it is fine as is. The idea that anything is wrong with it would be ridiculous. As a result, it does not indicate the precise time in accordance with any stated ideal of "absolute exactness." According to Philosophical Investigation and Wittgenstein's Later-views of philosophy, I explain things as they are and it is absurd to claim that there is anything wrong with it. (c) The Tractatus makes the key premise that a statement may be reduced to a simpler form that expresses the true meaning of the original proposition. It's important to note that Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation describes this idea as follows: "This assertion may be evaluated as the following conjunctions — The broom stick is in a corner and a brush is connected to the broom. Do you think the statement, "the broom stick is positioned in this corner" genuinely implies, "the broom stick is linked to this brush?" Not at all. Regardless of how you look at it, the broom has two distinct pieces, each with a unique relationship to the other, as Wittgenstein said. There are other ways of knowing what a particular word form truly means, and Wittgenstein argues that analysis is not the sole, or even the most essential method of doing this task, as he had previously thought in the Tractatus. A distinction between simple and complicated is an absolute, according to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. That a thing exists in and of itself, whether simple or complicated, and that is all there is to it is the end of the issue. Nothing he says is really straightforward. As a matter of fact, in certain circumstances. For example, although an object may be said to be simple in one situation, it may have to be referred to as composite in another. There are no absolutes when it comes to simplicity and complexity. A item may seem to be simple in one context, but complicated in another. When analysing a putative name in terms of the alphabet by which it is composed, a name may be considered simple when referring to the item it signifies. Things can't be taken away from their environment in absolute terms, according to Wittgenstein later in his life. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein thinks that the meaning of any word, which is a real proper name, is the object that it denotes.' (e) When it comes to the TLP, later-Wittgenstein believes that this perspective of the TLP is a

misinterpretation of the word meaning. He admits that the essential difference between the word and the bearer of a name was not grasped. To put it another way, the term employed by Ludwig Wittgenstein to refer to TLP objects is just the carrier of the object's meaning; thus, he feels that mature philosophical thought, which he defined by way of Philosophical Investigation, is correct.

Wittgenstein believes that the issue of truth is intertwined with the concepts of scepticism and assurance, as well as contradiction. Scepticism has been a fundamental part of philosophy since its inception. The sceptic questions the validity and truthfulness of all forms of original knowledge. They believe that the so-called "axioms" of knowing are unjustified and incomplete. A Jaina metaphor may help me dispel scepticism. For the sake of human ability, the Jaina Syadvada said that an item contains countless principles, but only one or two or more of these principles may be successfully known, while others can know other attributes, but not all. As a result, it is impossible for any one person to acquire complete knowledge of any one thing. Using logical language in the TLP, Wittgenstein expresses scepticism in the strongest terms.

What does it mean to question any object or fact in terms of language? It implies that whatever information he has must be supported by any true assertion or collection of true propositions, according to Wittgenstein. One of the ways Wittgenstein demonstrated how to represent the sceptical as "meaningless doubt" was by using the term "meaningless doubt." Scepticism, in Wittgenstein's view, is neither unrefutable nor unrefutable. We can only reveal its absurdity if we want to disprove it. When sceptics assert that "there aren't two hands," we may state that they have a previous idea of "hand," and that the sceptic can never assert that the concept of "hand" exists. That is why doubt can only come after we have accepted something as definite. There is no way to question anything you know. Students who constantly question their teachers while working on a math problem must have realised their worries were unfounded. In addition to this, the student has no idea how to raise doubts. Because of this, the pupil was unable to remember the amount. As a result, the presumption of doubt requires that we not question even the most basic axioms of logic and mathematical rules. It is incorrect to assert that $2+2 = 4$ is simply determined, and if it is repeated over and over again, we must conclude that he does not understand the rules of mathematics. Later-Wittgenstein or Philosophical Investigation would refer to this as 'the use of word for meaning into the forms of life' in TLP's terminology (Early-Wittgenstein).

When it comes to paradoxes and contradictions, how did Wittgenstein approach the subject? If we accept a statement as true or incorrect and then prove its polar opposite to be true, we have what philosophers term a paradox (A and not A). Even though a liar claims that "what I am saying is real," we know that assertion to be untrue, hence it is possible that the liar's speech is not genuine. Is his assertion true or untrue if he says, "What I'm saying isn't true?" As a result of this obvious truth, a paradox is created. Due to the logical forms of propositions, there is no opportunity for existence like these paradoxes in the TLP, where there is no scope for more than one interpretation. The P.I. does seem to have such scope, but Wittgenstein has shown that such a contradiction does not have a place in the P.I. An example given by Wittgenstein in the book P.I. is: "A and not A" is a so-called paradox, but may be demonstrated non-paradox by the right example. In other words, if someone claims to be 5 feet 11 inches but is really 4 feet 11 inches, it isn't always a contradiction. A person who claims to be 4 feet 11 inches tall may claim to be 5 feet 11 inches tall, and vice versa. Therefore, paradox is meaningless unless it is accompanied by a game of words.

In addition to philosophical notions, Wittgenstein believes that certainty has a positive relationship with Truth, which also has a relationship with linguistic analysis or the external situation. The first part of my presentation is devoted to a short discussion on various classical conceptions of truth, as well as Wittgenstein's response to or support for them. Correspondence theory of truth, Coherence theory of truth, and Pragmatism are the three primary conceptions of truth. Let me break it down for you one by one —

CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH AND WITTGENSTEIN: We think that, it is revolutionarily step of Wittgenstein in opposition to Wittgenstein's idea of correspondence truth. We know that the correspondence theory of truth uses structural or formal connections to relate its objects and facts. As far as the truth is concerned, it never makes any claims regarding certainty. First, a person may be baffled by a statement like "Copy and its original connection" because it relies on psychology, but Wittgenstein reveals a real condition of events which is accurate according to logic and logic never made an observer baffled since it has two values (either true or false). It is logically and scientifically possible to separate the "state of affairs" of Wittgenstein from his "one-to-one connection" theory of truth, and this may be done via the study of language. Example: "Siliguri is nearer to Gangarampur than Balurghat" if it is true; "Balurghat is nearer to Siliguri than Gangarampur" Irrefutable, although it might be incorrect or inconsistent.

In other words, we should agree with Wittgenstein and declare that truth is intertwined with reality and that reality is a blend of the actual and the possibility. True or false, based on reasoning, is the only way to determine whether or not anything is true or untrue. Fourth, the correspondence holds that a proposition-fact connection is "unanalysable," as Wittgenstein boldly declared via linguistic analysis. "Propositions" are defined in the TLP as "names" that represent an item. There is a difference between a model of reality and a depiction of the actual world. Look at the following graphic to see what's happening now and what could happen in the future:

NAME OF THE FRIENDS	RED SHIRT	BLUE SHIRT	YELLOW SHIRT
JOHN	@		
SMITH		@	
TOM			@

There's no doubt in anyone's mind that John is wearing a red shirt from the diagram above, which indicates that this is really the case. It's considered a potential condition of things since John has the option of wearing anything other than a red shirt, such a blue shirt, yellow shirt, etc. Wittgenstein's reasoning clearly explains what is "true," but can we be sure that an untruth is false? If we examine attentively, we will see that there is an implicit agreement of logic into the 'possibility of state of events,' but which state is impossible to exist that we may know by logical rules as 'round square,' definitely incorrect. Normally there is no certainty. Because of this, Wittgenstein correctly said in the TLP's last premise that "what can be said is clear(because it is the real condition of circumstances) and what cannot be uttered we must pass over in silence" (because, it is possible state of affairs). In the TLP, Wittgenstein was primarily interested in discovering the universe via logical language and the logical principles that distinguish between truth and untruth. While agreeing with the broad consensus that object is the ultimate building unit of the universe, he had assigned precedence to 'name' above object. "A name signifies an item," Wittgenstein wrote in TLP chapter 3.203. In a proposal, a name is a

representation of an object, as stated in 3.22 of TLP. In Wittgenstein's view, a proposition is a depiction of reality, and a proposition depicts how things stand if it is true.

A view of correspondence theory of truth by Wittgenstein's later work Wittgenstein said as early as the Philosophical Investigation that "a statement is to be meaningful if it has use in the community or tradition. An object's "name" isn't necessary for its representational purposes. What is the process through which a word is made meaningful? When asked why words have no inherent meaning, Wittgenstein simply replied that propositions have inherent meaning because of the rule they follow. The persistent practise of rule following is not private; it is public following. Every linguistic group has the same set of rules that we follow while communicating with others. Is a proposal only meaningful if it adheres to the rules? No, the 'forms of life' are of significant significance since they are strongly linked to language. It is not enough to know grammar and syntax to know a language, as Wittgenstein said in P.I. section 19, but we must also know the forms of life after J.F.M. Hunter. From person to person, there are many different kinds of life. In the P.I., Wittgenstein did not stray from his aim expressed in the TLP with regard to reality. A proposition might be object-oriented or metaphysical, but it is a model of reality, which implies that language is the sole method of conveying information about the world. The 'metaphysical concepts,' according to Wittgenstein, were added to the philosophy of language by expanding the scope of reality. Hence, Wittgenstein said, "The restriction of my language is the limitation of my universe". It's now a fundamental issue in the P.I to figure out how language really works. Words are simply like games, according to Wittgenstein. Many games are based on a mix of common and unique rules, much like a family, so we know how to play by following a set of rules. There are some members of a family that aren't precisely like the rest, yet we nevertheless embrace them as family members. Similarly, in language, there are many words and propositions that are never employed in the same way; rather, they are interpreted in various ways, a phenomenon dubbed "Language Games" by Ludwig Wittgenstein. If language is like a game, it will be very malleable and prone to error and misinterpretation. Because of the language and conventions we follow from our ways of living, Wittgenstein demonstrated the following assertions to be untrue..

P.I. WITTGENSTEIN'S COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH To be true, a statement must cohere with a larger number of propositions, whereas a proposition must cohere with less numbers to be false. The coherence theory of truth also accepts a self contradiction in the guise of 'less' and 'more' true. However, the essential issue is - what entities will decide the meanings of a statement of coherence theory? In other words, proper use of grammar. Propositions, according to Wittgenstein, aren't only significant because of their language. However, he does not reject the relevance of grammar; rather, he attempts to emphasise that language is rule-following, which is done in the forms of life of its users with the use of proper grammar in mind. So, in the P.I., the forms of life are the most important factor in making a proposal relevant. Wittgenstein argued that a statement is meaningful if it is used in the same linguistic community as other propositions (i.e., it does not cohere with other propositions) and in the forms of existence via language. What is the definition of a kind of life? A society's tacit agreement to employ a language that has real meaning is what philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein views as the forms of life. He also believes that reasoning cannot demonstrate the existence of living forms since all logical rules are established by life forms. As a result, the forms of life are predicated on logic and cannot be proven, like mathematical axioms.

As a result, all of our mental reflections, whether material or ideal, are expressed via language, according to Wittgenstein. According to him, the study of language is a precursor to the study of thinking, and both of these activities lead to the study of reality. He correctly said that only language analysis can answer philosophical difficulties, and as we know, Wittgenstein claimed in the Tractatus that, "reality arrives via

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language

through

thinking".

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